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I. lN1RODUCTION 
Family limited partnerships have been popular gift and estate 
tax planning vehicles for many years.) In recent years, family lim-
ited liability companies (LLCs) have also become common, particu-
larly in those states that have updated their statutes to take the 
check-the-box regulations into account. LLCs with more than one 
member are usually classified as partnerships for federal income tax 
purposes.2 In a typical structure, when there is adequate planning, 
the donors form a limited partnership or an LLC Uointly, "family 
limited liability entity" or FLLE) , to which they contribute assets 
expected to appreciate in value.3 The contribution is typically tax-
For a sampling of the available literature, relatively little of which is in 
traditional law reviews, see Edward D. Brown, Maximizing Minority Discounts 
for Limited Partnerships in an Integrated Estate Plan, 93 1. TAX'N 306 (2000); 
Joseph M. Mona, Use of LLCs in Estate Planning; 25 EST. PLAN. 167 (1998); 
Travis L. Bowen & Rick D. Bailey, Limited Partnerships: Use in Tax, Estate and 
Blfsiness Planning, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 305 (1996); James R. Repetti, Minority 
Disc0'1nts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REv. 415 (1995); 
Samuel Weiner & Steven D. Leibzig, Family Limited Partnership Can Leverage 
the Annual Exclusion and Unified Credit, 82 J. TAX'N 164 (1995); and Robert G. 
Kurzman, A Family Partnership Still May be the Best Entity to Meet Income, 
Estate Tax Goals, 17 EST. PLAN. 224 (1990). 
2 The check-the-box regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2000), dra-
matically changed the entity classification landscape. Before their adoption, there 
was a possibility that a limited partnership or an LLC could be classified as a 
corporation, though the possibility was quite remote. Under the default rule, how 
an entity is classified depends on how many owners it has. If the entity has a 
single owner who is an individual, it is treated as a sole proprietorship for federal 
income tax purposes. If the single owner is a corporation, it is treated as a divi-
sion. Alternatively, an entity may elect to be classified as a corporation for fed-
eral income tax purposes, but it is a rare entity that would make such an election, 
given the onus of double taxation for C-corporations. See 1.R.c. §§ 11, 301(c). In 
states with updated statutes, limited partnerships and LLCs may be fairly equal 
alternatives. In states without updated statutes, limited partnerships may be pref-
erable due to the unfavorable dissolution rules often applicable to LLCs in older 
statutes. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. See also KATHRYN G. HENKEL, 
ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION § 17.02[13] (1997). See gener-
ally MARK SARGENT & WALTER SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
HANDBOOK, chs. 1-3. 
3 Under section 1015, a donee of an FLLE interest generally takes the 
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free under section 721(b). In the case of a limited partnership, the 
donors (commonly parents or grandparents) will hold the general 
partnership interest, likely through a corporation, while in the case 
of an LLC, they will hold the managerial interest. They will, over 
time, make gifts of limited partnership interests or membership in-
terests to the donees (commonly children or grandchildren). The 
availability of minority-interest and lack-of-marketability discounts, 
discussed in detail below, means that gifts of ownership interests 
can be made at a value less than the proportionate share of the fair 
market value of the underlying assets. In making their annual gifts, 
the donors will take advantage of the section 2503(b) annual exclu-
sion, which may permit the fIrst $10,000 of discounted value gifted 
by a donor to each donee each year to be excluded from gift taxa-
tion.4 Thus, two parents can gift $20,000 per year per donee without 
same basis in it that the donor had. See l.R.e. § 1015. In the case of assets with a 
basis in excess of fair market value at the time of the gift, a donee generally takes 
a fair-market-value basis in gifted property for purposes of loss calculation, a 
carryover basis for gain calculation, and recognizes neither gain nor loss if the 
property sells for a price in between its fair market value at the time of the gift 
and its carryover basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1. Under section 1014, a person 
who acquires an FLLE interest by bequest, devise, or inheritance from a decedent 
generally takes a fair-market-value basis. See 1.R.e. § 1014. Where practical, it is 
wise to gift high-basis, appreciated property (or interests in FLLEs holding such 
property) and retain low-basis, appreciated property for eventual transfer after 
death. This approach maximizes the basis that the recipient takes in the property 
and reduces the income tax consequence on a later sale of the property. It may 
still be wise, however, to gift low-basis property if the property is expected to 
appreciate rapidly. The disadvantage of the low basis to the donee may be more 
than offset by the increased estate taxes to the donor if the property is included in 
the donor's estate and substantially appreciates before the donor's death. Further, 
any gain recognition on a sale of property may be subject to a favorable capital 
gains rate of taxation, commonly 20% under section 1. See I.R.e. § l(h). The gift 
and estate tax rate can be as high as 55%, and that rate applies to the full value of 
the property, not just the gain. See I.R.C. § 2001(b). If the property has an inher-
ent loss, the taxpayer is often wise to sell it, recognize the loss, and gift the result-
ing cash. 
4 Taxpayers are required to disclose gifts of interests in FLLEs in order for 
the statute of limitations to run. See T.D. 8845, 1999-2 C.B. 683 (1999); 1.R.c. 
§§ 650 1 (c)(9), 2504(c). Section 2503 provides that the first $10,000 per year 
given by each donor to each donee is not subject to gift taxation, provided that 
the interest given is a present interest. See 1.R.c. § 2503(b). This amount is ad-
justed for inflation for calendar years after 1998, rounded to the next lowest mul-
tiple of $1,000. See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(2). As this article goes to press, no inflation 
adjustment has yet been made, and future interests do not qualify for the exclu-
sion. Thus, if the gifted FLLE interest qualifies as a present interest, the first 
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$10,000 of (discounted) value per donee will be free of any gift tax or the need to 
use any portion of the applicable exclusion amount. The Service has ruled that a 
limited partnership interest can constitute a present interest, see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
9415007 (Jan. 12, 1994), and by extension, it is commonly assumed that a mem-
bership interest in an LLC constitutes a present interest as well. 
However, in a technical advice memorandum (TAM) with unusual facts, 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9751003 (Aug. 28, 1997), the Service ruled that a limited part-
nership interest did not constitute a present interest, casting doubt on the area. In 
TAM 9751003, the donor/general partner had not only the discretion as to when 
to distribute partnership funds, but also could retain partnership funds ''for any ... 
reason whatsoever." Further, no limited partner was entitled to a return of capital 
until 2022, and no limited partner could withdraw from the partnership except on 
assignment of all of her partnership interest. Assignment was generally not al-
lowed without a super-majority vote of the partners. See id 
The Service noted that a gift can be separated into its component parts, 
anyone of which may qualify as a present interest. In this case, the Service con-
sidered the right to income and a right to transfer the interest. In the Service's 
view, the fact that the general partner could withhold the income for any reason 
whatsoever effectively obviated the fiduciary obligation ordinarily imposed on a 
general partner, which might otherwise be relied on to insure that income would 
be appropriately distributed. The uncertainty as to when or whether the limited 
partners would receive any income prevented the income interest from constitut-
ing a present interest. In reaching this conclusion, the Service used some disturb-
ing language. It said that the income component of the limited partnership inter-
ests failed to require, at the time of the gifts, that there be a steady and ascertain-
able flow of income to a donee or limited partner. See id In the past, the Service 
had not insisted on a steady flow of income for partnership interests to constitute 
present interests (though that has been the standard in other contexts, see Comm'r 
v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1945)), and it was unclear whether the Service 
might attempt to require this in the future. In the TAM, the Service also said that 
the partnership agreement's limitations on transfers of the limited partnership 
interests meant that the limited partnership interests lacked the tangible and im-
mediate economic benefits necessary to constitute a present interest in this regard 
as well. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9751003, err 26. 
Technical Advisory Memorandum 199944003 (July 2, 1999), may have 
calmed the waters a bit. In this later TAM, the taxpayers formed a limited part-
nership and acted as the general partners. Gifts of limited partnership interests 
were made to their children. The partnership agreement permitted net cash flow 
to be distributed annually to the partners, but did not require it. Limited partners 
could assign their partnership interests. The assignees were entitled to distribu-
tions of net cash flow or other property but could become a substituted limited 
partner only with the unanimous written consent of the general partners, as de-
cided in their sole and absolute discretion. The Service concluded the limited 
partnership interests qualified as present interests. See id. The Service noted that 
the applicable law entitled a partner to distributions before withdrawal or dissolu-
tion. Limited partners could withdraw at any time. The general partners were 
under a strict fiduciary duty toward the limited partners and the partnership. 
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gift tax consequences.5 If a donor gifts property with a value in ex-
cess of $10,000 per donee, the donor must file a gift tax return.6 An 
actual gift tax is only due, however, if the total lifetime taxable gifts 
made by the donor exceed the "applicable exclusion amount." The 
applicable exclusion amount for 2000 and 2001 is $675,000.7 Gen-
erally, only cumulative lifetime and death transfers in excess of 
those amounts are actually subject to a gift or estate tax Uointly, 
"transfer tax"). 8 
The available discounts can be significant. If a property di-
rectly owned by donors is worth $100,000, it can, through an FLLE, 
be gifted indirectly over time to donees at a value of perhaps only 
$65,000.9 Once properly gifted, the assets are also excluded from 
the donor's estate when he dies; any subsequent appreciation inures 
to the benefit of the donees and can stay out of the estate of the do-
nor and therefore out of the hands of the estate tax fisc. This type of 
planning will be of particular interest to persons who expect their 
estates to be subject to an estate tax. 
A variant of this form with which the Internal Revenue Service 
(Service) and the courts have struggled of late involves an FLLE 
formed shortly before a decedent's death. The decedent contributes 
property to the FLLE and thus no longer holds the property directly. 
Given these factors, the Service concluded that the limited partners had the right 
to the immediate use, possession, and enjoyment of the interest. See id. 
The moral of the two TAMs is that the donors have to give the limited 
partners a little "wiggle room." If, as in TAM 9751003, the donor retains total 
control, the Service likely will conclude that the donees have not received a pre-
sent interest. If, on the other hand, a more typical limited partnership agreement 
is used and the limited partners have some independent rights to obtain a current 
economic benefit (such as by assigning the interest), the promised land of section 
2503(b) likely will be reached. 
5 Spouses may split gifts so that a $20,000 gift by one spouse is treated as 
if each spouse made a $10,000 gift. I.RC. § 2513. 
6 I.RC. § 6019. 
7 The applicable exclusion amount increases to $700,000 in 2002 and 
2003, $850,000 in 2004, $950,000 in 2005, and $1,000,000 in 2006 and thereaf-
ter. See I.RC. §§ 2505, 2010. Given the rate of change of tax laws, and the inten-
tions of the current occupant of the White House, it is unlikely that these amounts 
would remain unchanged until phase-in has been completed. 
8 FLLEs can also offer a number of nontax benefits. They permit the 
smooth transfer of assets from one generation to the next. They provide a practi-
cal vehicle in which to hold property for extended families. Management can be 
readily centralized, and the owners can be protected against vicarious liability. 
9 See HENKEL, supra note 2, § 16.03[I][c]. 
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Instead, the decedent holds interests in the FLLE that owns the 
property. The decedent normally holds the bulk of the interests in 
the FLLE. Other family members usually control the corporate gen-
eral partner of a limited partnership or are the managing members 
of an LLC. Notwithstanding the formal structure, however, in many 
instances the decedent retains actual control. Beyond shifting con-
trol, typically only a few, if any, transfers of interests in the FLLE 
are made to others. This structure may give rise to a form of minor-
ity-interest discount. While the courts and commentators use the 
term minority-interest discount, it is something of a misnomer, 
since the decedent typicaliy holds most of the interests. A "lack-of-
control" discount might be a better term. Further, since it can be 
harder to sell interests. in an FLLE than to sell the underlying prop-
erty, a lack-of-marketability discount might also be justified. The 
disputes that have arisen with the Service commonly involve 
FLLEs that are formed in the name of the decedent shortly before 
her death by a family member using a power of attoniey, sometimes 
creating, almost literally, a last-minute artifice designed to reduce 
estate taxes. The Service has hotly disputed this approach, though 
to date with little success in the courts. Very recently, in Estate of 
Strangi v. Commissioner,lo the Tax Court had the opportunity to 
review one such FLLE, and a heavily divided court concluded that 
it could not ignore the formation of the FLLE for valuation pur-
poses. While the court rejected many of the Service's core argu-
ments, it also expressed concern over the legitimacy of the dece-
dent's actions. II 
This article will focus on such use of FLLEs as found in the 
Strangi case and offer proposals for reform. It is hardly wise tax 
policy to permit taxpayers to significantly reduce transfer taxes by 
dint of a last-minute FLLE of potentially no lasting substance. Fur-
ther, the line that taxpayers need to cross in order for the structure 
to fail is decidedly blurry. Accordingly, this article recommends a 
brighter line. Section 2035 should be amended to provide that the 
transfer of assets by a decedent to a family-controlled FLLE within 
three years of her death would be ignored for estate tax purposes. 
Under this proposed amendment, the transfer of an interest in such 
an FLLE to members of the decedent's family within three years of 
her death would also be ignored. As the Internal Revenue Code 
10 115 T.e. 478 (2000). 
11 [d. at 485, 489-90. 
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(Code) section 2001(b) already provides, credit would be given 
against the estate tax for any gift tax paid on the lifetime transfers. 12 
This approach would stop the most blatant abuses in the use of 
FLLEs while permitting the use of FLLEs for legitimate estate 
planning, provided that it is done three years before the death of the 
decedent. 
II. RELATED ISSUES 
A. Business Purpose 
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) defmes a part-
nership as an association formed to carry on a business for profit. 13 
That provision should also apply to limited partnerships. 14 Thus, to 
be in compliance with typical state law, a limited partnership must. 
have a business purpose. Many state LLC statutes do not impose a 
business or profit requirement, however, and only require that the 
LLC be formed for a lawful purpose.15 Under the check-the-box 
regulations, a typical multi-member business LLC is classified as a 
partnership for federal income tax purposes, but an LLC can also 
elect to be taxed as a corporation. 16 The question is whether a non-
business LLC can be given that same classification. The Code de-
fmes a partnership for federal income tax purposes as "a syndicate, 
group, pool, joint venture, or other incorporated organization, 
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or 
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this 
title, a trust or estate or a corporation."I? While not free from doubt, 
the Code here also suggests the need for a business objective. The 
check-the-box regulations state that they are providing rules for the 
classification of "business entities," again indicating the need for a 
business nexus. IS The courts have required the conduct of some 
12 See 1.R.c. § 2001(b). 
13 See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 101(6),6 u.L.A. 37 (Supp. 2001). 
14 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT §§ 101(7) (amended 1985), 1106, 
6A V.L.A. 61 (1976). 
15 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Corps & Ass'n § 4A-201 (1993). 
16 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701(b). See also SARGENT & SCHWIDETZKY, supra 
note 2, ch. 2. 
17 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2). 
18 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). 
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business activity before finding that a valid tax partnership exits. 19 
Finally, the Service often attacks transactions because they lack a 
business purpose.20 Strict adherence to the business requirement 
might forestall the use of LLCs for transferring property with a 
purely personal character, such as a vacation home used only for 
personal purposes.21 . 
B. Marketable Securities/Investment FLLEs 
The question that remains open is whether an FLLE that pri-
marily holds marketable securities or other investment assets has a 
sufficient business purpose. The Service conceivably could view 
the general partners or managing members as trustees and the lim-
19 See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 514-15 
(7th Cir. 1980); Estate of Winkler v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1657, 1663 
(1997). 
20 See, e.g., Strangi, 115 T.C. at 485-86. 
21 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200004022 (Jan. 28, 20(0). In this ruling, the taxpay-
ers, apparently husband and wife, transferred 98% of their principal residence to 
a trust that was a grantor trust for federal income tax purposes. Grantor trusts 
generally are ignored for federal income tax purposes, and the grantor of the trust 
is deemed to be the owner of the property owned by the trust. The taxpayers 
(with a remaining 2% direct ownership) and the trust then transferred the resi-
dence to a limited partnership. One question was whether this met the state law 
business purpose test that is common for partnerships. The private letter ruling 
did not address this issue but did note that the partnership also held "several 
small rental properties." [d. These latter properties may have been contributed to 
meet a state-law business purpose requirement. The Service did not focus on the 
rental properties or, apparently, consider their existence to be relevant to its 
analysis. The taxpayers were the general partner; the trust was the limited part-
ner. Therefore, the taxpayers remained the only persons with any ultimate interest 
in the underlying property. The partnership ultimately deeded the property back 
to the taxpayers and the trust. At issue was the application of section 121, which 
permits $250,000 of gain on the sale of a principal residence to be excluded from 
gross income if the taxpayers meet certain holding period requirements. See 
1.R.c. § 121. The Service ruled that "in order for afederal tax law partnership to 
exist, the parties must, in good faith and with a business purpose, intend to join 
together in the present conduct of an enterprise and share in the profits or losses 
of the enterprise." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200004022 (Jan. 28, 20(0) (emphasis added). 
The Service held that since the residence served no business purpose of the part-
nership or the taxpayers, the taxpayers were treated as owners of the residence 
during the time it was held by the partnership. [d. The Service went on to con-
clude that for the purposes of the section 121 holding-period requirement, the 
taxpayers could count, as part of their holding period, the time the limited part-
nership held the residence. See id. 
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ited partners or passive members as beneficiaries, and treat the 
structure as a trust. The passive nature of the enterprise might en-
courage this approach. Investment partnerships, however, have 
commonly been upheld, both for state law and federal income tax 
purposes, despite the fact that no true business is being conducted. 
Indeed, the Code specifically contemplates investment partnerships 
that have never engaged in a trade or business and that primarily 
hold cash, stocks, bonds, notes, etc.22 
Having the FILE hold both traditional business assets and 
marketable securities may make it easier for it to survive judicial 
scrutiny. Estate of Church v. United States,23 discussed below,24 
involved a limited partnership that held both marketable securities 
as well as a substantial, working ranch. The court permitted sub-
stantial discounts.25 
Estate of Harper v. Commissioner6 involved a family limited 
partnership, the primary assets of which were marketable securities. 
While the focus of the case was on section 2704(b),27 it is notewor-
thy that the Service did not raise, and the court was not disturbed 
by, the type of assets held by the partnership.28 Finally, in some 
districts lhe Service regularly seems willing to settle cases involv-
ing FLLEs holding marketable securities, often for total discounts 
in the 30% range.29 While it would be preferable to have unambi-
guous case law, existing case law and much of the Service's own 
conduct do not suggest that investment FLLEs are in any great peril 
for lacking a business purpose. 
In order for the formation of an FLLE holding marketable se-
curities to get a tax-free treatment, the FLLE cannot constitute an 
investment company.30 There are different ways by which an FLLE 
is deemed to be an investment company, but the one most relevant 
22 See 1.R.e. § 731(c)(3)(C)(i). 
23 2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) <J[ 60,369 (W.O. Tex. 2000). 
24 See infra Part III.D. 
25 See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 84,781. 
26 79 T.e.M. (CCH) 2232 (2000). 
27 See infra Part U(F)(2). 
28 See Harper, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2233. 
29 See Michael 1. Eggers, Settlement Data and the Effect on Family Limited 
Partnership Discounts, 21 EST. PLAN. & CAL. PROB. REp. 137 (Apr. 2000). The 
Estate Planning and California Probate Reporter is a publication of Continuing 
Education of the Bar of California. 
30 See I.R.C. § 721(b). 
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in this context is if more than 80% of the FLLE's assets, by value, 
consist of money, stocks, securities and other comparable assets.3) 
C. Section 704( e) 
At one time, the Service argued that donees of partnership in-
terests were not bona fide partners, but section 704(e) now gener-
ally overrules that view.32 A partner who receives her interest by 
gift will be recognized as a bona fide partner, provided capital is a 
material income-producing factor for the partnership.33 It should be 
noted, however, that section 704(e) also requires that each interest 
share proportionately in partnership income generated by capital. 34 
Thus, the Code does not allow a dilution of the donor's share of 
income by an inappropriate special allocation35 of such income to 
the donee partners. Section 704( e) further requires the donor to be 
adequately compensated for services rendered to the partnership. 36 
31 See id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.351-I(c)(I) (2001) (as modified by Tax 
Relief Act of 1997 § 1002, amending 1.R.c. § 351(e». There are exceptions for 
. insignificant diversification and where each of several transferors transfers a 
diversified portfolio. 
32 See I.R.c. § 704(e). 
33 I.R.c. § 704(e)(1). 
34 I.R.c. § 704(e)(3). 
35 Section 704 permits special allocations of income and loss to partners, 
provided that the allocation has substantial economic effect. See 1.R.c. § 704(b). 
It is then possible, for example, to allocate 90% of depreciation deductions to 
someone who is otherwise a 50% partner. In the family context, however, section 
704 typically requires proportionate allocation of income to the donor. See I.R.C. 
§ 704(e)(3). 
36 Taxpayers should be cautious about naming minor children as partners. 
The Service has stated that a minor child must be competent to manage her own 
business affairs in order to be recognized as a member of a partnership; in order 
to be a partner, a minor must have sufficient maturity and experience to be 
treated by disinterested persons as competent to enter into business dealings and 
otherwise to conduct his affairs on a basis of equality with adult persons. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(viii). A minor who does not meet this standard, how-
ever, can still be a recognized partner as long as another person acts in a fiduciary 
capacity and exercises control over the partnership interest for the sole benefit of 
the minor; and accordingly, many practitioners place the partnership interest of a 
minor, especially younger minors, in trust or appoint a custodian to hold the in-
terest. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (e)(2)(vii). Taking advantage of the $10,000 
annual exclusion of section 2503(b) may require the use of "Crummey" powers. 
For a discussion of how these powers work, see HENKEL, supra note 2, § 
10.03[4]. 
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D. Minority-Interest Discount 
A decedent's interest in an FLLE may be given a minority-
interest discount. Notwithstanding the common use of this term, a 
lack-of-control discount might be a better term in the context of this 
article. The decedent typically will own the bulk of the interests in 
the FLLE. Others will control the general partner of a limited part-
nership or be the managers of an LLC. The discount arises because 
the decedent cannot control current management decisions and con-
sequently the entity's future. It also reflects a lack of control over 
the quality of the investment represented by the interest. For exam-
ple, whether or not distributions will be made is in the hands of oth-
ers.37 The Tax Court has ruled that family attribution rules are not 
applied to limit the availability of minority-interest discounts.38 A 
decedent's family can therefore own the majority (or all) of the in-
terests in an FLLE, and a minority-interest discount can still be 
available.39 
E. Lack-oj-Marketability Discount 
The lack-of-marketability discount arises from the decedent's 
inability (or reduced ability) to readily dispose of the interest in the 
FLLE.40 An interest could lack marketability even though the 
37 See Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78, 103-109 (1986). See also LeFrak v. 
Comm'r, 66 T.e.M.(CCH) 1297, 1307-1309 (1993); Estate of Trenchard v. 
Comm'r, 69 T.e.M.(CCH) 2164, 2172-74 (1995). Of course, there can be no 
minority-interest discount if the taxpayer owns all of the interests in the entity. 
38 See Estate of Andrews v. Comm'r, 79 T.e. 938 (1982) (involving corpo-
rate stock). If family attribution rules were applied, children, for example, could 
be considered to own the interests owned by their parents for purposes of deter-
mining whether a minority interest was held. See 1.R.e. § 318(a)(I). 
39 In an attempt to counter this across-the-board discount, the Service has 
argued that the value of a minority interest is enhanced if it represents a swing 
vote. The court in Winkler, 57 T.e.M. at 381, determined that a minority-held 
block of common stock that constituted the swing vote in a company controlled 
by two separate families should be increased in value by at least 10%. This in-
crease effectively eliminated the minority-interest discount the family had origi-
nally claimed. See id. For a similar example, see Estate of Simp lot v. Commis-
sioner, 112 T.e. 130 (1999), in which the Service successfully argued that where 
the estate held voting stock in a corporation with an unusual capital structure of 
voting and nonvoting stock, a premium for voting privileges was appropriate. See 
112 T.e. at 172-73. 
40 Andrews, 79 T.C. at 953. 
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owner holds a majority of the total interests. The Tax Court has 
given such a discount to a decedent who owned 61 % of the stock in 
a corporation.41 The court reasoned that a lack-of-marketability dis-
count was warranted because there was no established market for 
the corporation's stock, which was unlisted and closely held.42 No 
lack-of-marketability discount, however, should be available if the 
decedent owns 100% of the relevant FLLE, since then the taxpayer 
would have total control, and could sell all of the ownership inter-
ests or cause the entity to sell all of its assets.43 A buyer in such an 
instance should pay full value, since she could buy all there is to 
acqurre. 
Many states provide that a limited partner may have his indi-
vidual interest liquidated for fair value on six months' notice unless 
the partnership agreement provides to the contrary.44 An increasing 
number of states, in response to prompting from the estate planning 
practitioners, are eliminating this right.45 If the state allows for such 
a withdrawal, the amount of any lack-of-marketability discount 
would be reduced, since it would be easier to liquidate the interest. 
The discount should not be reduced to zero, however, since what 
constitutes a fair value is uncertain. Further, the limited partner 
would have to wait six months, during which time the fair value 
could change. These limitations should allow for a meaningful lack-
of-marketability discount. Most states with withdrawal rights per-
mit the partnership agreement to override it; however, due to' the 
application of section 2704(b), discussed below, such a provision 
will not improve the discount.46 
Both limited partnerships and LLCs can "dissolve." A dissolu-
tion is not a liquidation of the FLLE. From the outside world's per-
41 See Trenchard, 69 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2172-73. The court determined that 
in this case a control premium existed. See id.; see also Estate of Newhouse v. 
Comm'r, 94 T.e. 193,249-52 (1990). 
42 See Trenchard, 69 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2173. 
43 Indeed, the entity would have to be an LLe. 
44 See, e.g., N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 121-602 (McKinney 2001); S. Stacy East-
land, Family Limited Partnerships: Transfer Tax Benefits, 7 FROB. & PROP. 59, 
61 (1993). 
45 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 1O-603(a) (1999). This 
section was amended in 1998 to eliminate the six-month withdrawal right and 
provide that unless the partnership agreement provides to the contrary, a limited 
partner may not withdraw before the dissolution and winding up of the limited 
partnership. See id. 
46 See infra Part II.F.2. 
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spective, nothing may appear to have happened, but there can have 
been a technical termination of the FLLE, typically immediately 
followed by its reformation.47 A withdrawal of a general partner of 
a limited partnership or a member of an LLC can cause a dissolu-
tion. It may take a vote of the majority of the owners to continue an 
FLLE once it has been dissolved. This in tum makes it more likely 
that the FLLE will liquidate, giving the owners value for their inter-
ests. The more likely the prospect of a dissolution, the lower the 
. lack-of-marketability discount should be. The withdrawal of a lim-
ited partner typically does not cause the dissolution of a limited 
partnership.48 However, the withdrawal of a member of an LLC 
historically did cause it to dissolve. This used to make a limited 
partnership preferable to an LLC for family estate planning, since 
there was less chance of a dissolution and, therefore, a greater lack-
of-marketability discount. However, as states amend their LLC 
statutes to take into account the check-the-box regulations, state 
statutes increasingly provide that the withdrawal of a member of an 
LLC does not cause a dissolution ofthe LLC.49 
F. Section 2704 
1. In General 
Congress enacted section 2704 to curtail the use of restrictions 
and lapsing rights as estate planning tools. Previously, for example, 
a restriction on liquidation rights might have been placed on a fam-
ily partnership interest prior to its transfer to another family mem-
ber, possibly reducing its value considerably. In many instances, 
after the transfer, the partners agreed to remove the restriction, or 
else the restriction automatically lapsed. The donor's controlling 
interests often were designed to lapse upon her death. As a result, 
there may have been no interest to value in the donor's estate. Now, 
however, section 2704 places constraints on both of these planning 
areas.50 The part of section 2704 that is most relevant in the context 
of this article is section 2704(b). 
47 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIB STEIN 
ON PARTNERSHIP § 7.01 (2001); LARRY E. RIB STEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 
RmSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 11.01 (2001). 
48 See BROMBERG & RmSTEIN, supra note 46, §§ 17.01(f), 17.05. 
49 See RIB STEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 46, § 11.01. 
50 See generally HENKEL, supra note 2, §§ 16.03[3][d]-[e]. 
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2. Section 2704(b) and the Applicable Restriction 
Section 2704(b) provides that if there is a transfer of an interest 
in a partnership to a member of the donor's family,5l any"applica-
ble restriction" is ignored in determining the value of the interest.52 
An applicable restriction is any restriction that limits the ability of 
the partnership to liquidate, provided either that the restriction by its 
terms can lapse or that the transferor or any member of the trans-
feror's family, either alone or collectively, has the right to remove 
the restriction. 53 Thus, a provision in a family limited partnership 
agreement stating that the consent of 100% of the partners is re-
quired for liquidation, when state law only requires 70% consent, 
would be an applicable restriction, since the family as a group could 
have the provision removed from the agreement.54 
A limited partner normally will not have a statutory power to 
cause a liquidation of a limited partnership. 55 Many states, however, 
51 Defiged as the transferor's spouse, the transferor's or her spouse's ances-
tors and lineal descendants, and the brother or a sister of the transferor. Also 
included are spouses of the covered ancestor, lineal descendants, brothers, and 
sisters. See 1.R.e. § 2704(c)(2). 
52 1.R.e. § 2704(b). 
53 See id. Section 2704 excludes from the definition of an applicable restric-
tion any restriction imposed by federal or state law. See 1.R.e. § 2704(b)(3)(B). 
Also excluded is any commercially reasonable restriction which arises as part of 
any financing by the corporation or partnership with a person who is not related 
to the transferor or transferee, or a member of the family of either. See 1.R.e. § 
2704(b)(3)(A). The regulations provide somewhat liberally that an applicable 
restriction is a limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in part) 
that is more restrictive than the limitations that would apply under the state law 
generally applicable to the entity in the absence of the restriction. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 25.2704-2(b). In Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), the Tax Court 
held that a provision in a partnership agreement that a partnership would liqui-
date as of a certain date or when agreed to by the partners did not involve an 
applicable restriction because state law provided that a limited partnership would 
dissolve upon the occurrence of events specified in the partnership agreement or 
by the written consent of all of the partners. See 113 T.e. at 472. Accord Estate 
of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.e. 121, 132-33 (2001); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 
506,513-14 (2000); Harper, 79 T.C.M. (CCA) at 2234. 
54 Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(d), ex. 1. The Treasury Regulations provide that 
an option, the right to use property, or an agreement that is subject to section 
2703 does not constitute an applicable restriction. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-
2(b). 
55 REVISED VNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801,6 V.L.A. 108 (Supp. 2001). 
2001] Last-Gasp Estate Planning 15 
provide that a limited partner may withdraw on six-months' notice 
and be paid fair value for her interest unless the partnership agree-
ment provides to the contrary. 56 If there is such a provision to the 
contrary in the partnership agreement, some have thought section 
2704(b) would treat it as an applicable restriction and require that it 
be ignored for the purpose of computing the discounts.57 Indeed, 
many states have removed the right of a limited partner to withdraw 
on six months' notice, so as to improve the availability of discounts, 
and to address the fear that if the partnership agreement removed 
the right it would trigger the section 2704(b) applicable restriction 
rules. 58 Recently, however, in Kerr v. Commissioner, 59 the Tax 
Court held that section 2704(b) did not apply to limited partner 
withdrawal provisions, rejecting the argument to the contrary by the 
Service.6o The court premised its holding on the fact that the appli-
cable restriction rules of section 2704(b) only speak to limitations 
on the liquidation of a partnership as a whole, and do not address 
limited-partner withdrawal. 61 
A comparable issue exists for LLCs. Only a minority of states 
permits members of an LLC to voluntarily withdraw; a right to 
payment is then uncommon, and dissolution is generally not trig-
gered.62 To the extent withdrawal and payment rights do exist, un-
der Kerr it would appear they could be removed by the operating 
agreement without concern for section 2704(b), assuming dissolu-
tion would not be triggered. Many states, however, provide that an 
LLC will dissolve on an event of involuntary disassociation such as 
the death, bankruptcy, or expUlsion of a member unless the operat-
ing agreement provides to the contrary.63 If a provision in the oper-
ating agreement does provide to the contrary, even under Kerr the 
provision could constitute an applicable restriction according to 
section 2704(b), since, unlike a withdrawal, it limits the ability of 
the LLC to liquidate. The LLC statutes contain such dissolution 
provisions in order to avoid the characteristic of continuity of life, 
56 UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 603 (amended 1985), 6A V.L.A. 217 (1976). 
57 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997). 
58 See BROMBERG & RmSTEIN, supra note 46, § 17.01(c). 
59 113 T.e. 449. 
60 See 113 T.e. at 463-64. See also Jones, 116 T.e. at 132-33; Knight, 115 
T.e. at 513-14; Harper, T.e.M. (CCH) at 2234. 
61 See Kerr, 113 T.e. at 473. 
62 See RmSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 46, app. 11-1. 
63 Id. § 11.02. 
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an important consideration under the pre-check-the-box regulations 
but now just so much excess baggage.64 Statutory dissolution pro vi- . 
sions can reduce the availability of the lack-of-marketability dis-
count, since it makes it more likely that the LLC will liquidate and 
the owners receive value for their interests. Consequently, the trend 
is for state statutes to provide that LLCs have perpetual life, elimi-
nating this issue altogether.65 
III. THE SHAM-TAMs 
A. The Basics 
In a series of Technical Advice Memoranda, the Service ig-
nored the creation of FILEs, instead valuing a decedent's estate as 
if it held the assets of the FLLE directly.66 The TAMs had similar 
facts. Typically, children of a dying parent created an FLLE on be-
half of the parent, using either a power of attorney granted them by 
the parent or their powers as trustees of a trust created for the bene-
fit of the parent. The children controlled the FLLE and the parent 
held the bulk of the beneficial interests in it. In one case, a limited 
partnership was created within two days after the parent's death--
after the parent had been removed from life support.67 By having 
the parent shift from direct ownership to indirect ownership through 
an FLLE controlled by the children, the children hoped that the par-
ent's estate would obtain minority-interest and lack-of-
marketability discounts on the FLLE interests retained by the par-
ent. In the TAMs, the parent's estate took discounts ranging from 
30% to 55%.68 
64 See id. §§ 11.01, 16.20. Prior to the check-the-box regulations, an unin-
corporated entity could be classified as a corporation in the highly unlikely event 
that it had a majority of the following characteristics: continuity of life, central-
ized management, limited liability, and free transferability of interest. See 
SARGENT & SCHWIDETZKY, supra note 2, ch. 2. 
65 See RmSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 46, § 11.01. See also MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 4A-203(1). 
66 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 
9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9735003 (May 8, 1997); Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 9736004 (June 6, 1997). 
67 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997). 
68 Compare Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997) (38%) with Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 9735004 (Apr. 21, 1997) (55%). 
2001] Last-Gasp Estate Planning 17 
The Service made several arguments for its holdings. One of 
the arguments, in essence, was that given the proximity of the death 
and the lack of direct involvement by the decedent, the FLLEs were 
shams.69 The Service cited Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner70 as 
authority for its position.7) In Murphy, eighteen days before the de-
cedent died, she had transferred to her two children less than a 2% 
stock interest in a family-run, closely-held corporation.72 The trans-
fer reduced the decedent's ownership interest in the corporation to 
just below 50%. The estate claimed a minority-interest discount for 
the remaining stock. The Tax Court denied the discount, stating that 
a minority-interest discount should not be applied if the explicit 
purpose and effect of fragmenting the control block of stock was 
solely to reduce federal tax.73 However, the court did allow a dis-
count for lack of marketability.74 
Murphy should be contrasted with Estate of Frank v. Commis-
sioner.75 In Frank, the son of the decedent held the decedent's 
power of attorney. Two days before the decedent's death, pursuant 
to the power of attorney, the son transferred stock owned by the 
decedent to the decedent's wife. The transfer reduced the dece-
dent's ownership interest in the family corporation from over 50% 
to 32%.76 The court held that the transfer was valid and allowed a 
20% minority-interest discount and a 30% lack-of-marketability 
discount on the remaining stock included in the estate.77 The Ser-
vice argued that the court should apply the substance-over-form 
doctrine and ignore the transfer. 78 The court refused to do so, noting 
that if tax avoidance were the sole motive, a substantially smaller 
number of shares could have been transferred.79 As I will discuss in 
69 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 
9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 21, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9736004 (June 6,1997). 
70 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1990). 
71 See Tech. Adv. Mem, 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 
9736004 (Apr. 21, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 21, 1997); Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997). 
72 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 645. 
73 See id. at 658. 
74 See id. at 657. 
75 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2255 (1995). 
76 See id. at 2256-57. 
77 See id. at 2259,2263. 
78 See id. at 2259. 
79 See id. 
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more detail below,so the extent to which a decedent transfers inter-
ests in FLLEs shortly before death should not be a basis for a differ-
ing tax treatment. If the formation of an FLLE shortly before death 
is a problem, it should be a problem whether or not the decedent 
transfers in~erests. Otherwise, decedents will be able to avoid attack 
by the simple expedient of making the necessary transfers, elevat-
ing form over substance.S1 
B. Section 2703 
In the TAMs, the Service made an apparently unprecedented 
argument, stating that section 2703(a)(2) applied, which provides 
that the value of property is determined without regard to "any re-
striction on the right to sell or use such property."S2 In the Service's 
view, the "partnership or LLC wrapper" covering the decedent's 
assets was a restriction within the meaning of section 2703(a)(2) 
and, therefore, should be ignored.s3 Without the FLLE wrapper, the 
decedent could still be considered to own the bulk of the relevant 
property, which, to that extent, eliminates the discounts. 
Section 2703(b) provides an exception to the application of 
section 2703(a)(2) if the following three tests are met: (1) the ar-
rangement is a bona fide business transaction, (2) the transaction is 
not a device to transfer property to members of the family of the 
decedent for less than full consideration, and (3) the transaction has 
terms that are comparable to similar transactions entered into by 
persons dealing at arm's length.S4 In the TAMs, the Service con-
cluded that section 2703(b) did not apply. 85 It would be a rare FLLE 
that could meet the requirements of this section, since typically the 
whole point of the transfer is to provide a device to transfer prop-
80 See infra Part VI. 
81 Most likely, there would be no transfer tax savings beyond any availabil-
ity of the discounts, since gift taxes paid within t.lrree years of death are brought 
back into the estate under section 2035, and property is unlikely to change in 
value between the time of a death-bed gift and the time of death. See I.R.C. § 
2035. 
82 1.R.c. § 2703(a)(2). See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997). 
83 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 
9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997). 
84 See 1.R.c. § 2703(b). 
85 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); Tech. Adv. Mem. 
9735003 (May 8, 1997). 
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erty to members of the family of the decedent for less than full con-
sideration, contrary to part two of the exception. 86 
However, the legislative history to section 2703(a)(2) does 
not seem to contemplate the manner in which the Service is apply-
ing its provisions. The section appears to have been intended to 
prevent buy-sell agreements among family members from reducing 
the value of the interests the family members hold, rather than to 
provide an opportunity to ignore the formation of an FLLE alto-
gether.87 Further, the Service's approach would mostly render moot 
section 2704(b), which Congress presumably would not have in-
tended.88 There would be little need to have "applicable restric-
tions" in the operating agreement be ignored under such a rule. The 
Service's use of section 2703(a)(2) is aggressive and, in fact, has 
not met with success in the courts. 
C. The Courts 
In a number of recent cases, the Service has used a variety of 
arguments to attack FLLEs.89 Somewhat surprisingly in some cases, 
the Service has had little success. Still, one detects genuine skepti-
cism toward FLLEs formed near death, and the final judicial chap-
ter on the matter likely has not been written. 
1. The Church Case 
In Estate of Church v. Commissioner,9o Mrs. Church and her 
two children owned a combined 57% interest in a large ranch, 
which they leased for grazing and oil and gas drilling. 91 Distant 
relatives owned the balance of the ranch, which was managed by 
86 But see Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) 'II 60,369. 
87 See HENKEL, supra note 2, § 16.03[3][c]. 
88 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text. 
89 In Field Service Advice Memorandum 200049003, the Service gives a 
variety of bases for attacking FLLEs, which are in fact generally used in the cases 
discussed below. Field Servo Adv. Mem. 200049003 (Sept. 1,2000). 
90 2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) 'II 60,369. For a discussion of Church, as well as 
of Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.e. 144 (2000), discussed infra 
notes 168-178 and accompanying text, see Jerald August and Adi Rappoport, 
Recent Decisions Frustrate Service's Efforts to Challenge FLPs, 27 EST. PLAN. 
19 (2000). 
91 See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.e. (CCH) at 84,777. 
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Mrs. Church's children.92 Mrs. Church intended to transfer 
$1,000,000 in marketable securities and her interest in the ranch to 
a newly formed family limited partnership.93 Her two children also 
intended to transfer their interests in the family ranch to the partner-
ship.94 There was apparently no intent on the part of Mrs. Church to 
transfer the partnership interests she was to receive to others. The 
general partner was supposed to be a corporation controlled by the 
two children.95 Two days after attempting to form the relevant enti-
ties, Mrs. Church died of a heart attack.96 While she had been ill 
with cancer, her death was unexpected.97 At the time of her death, 
the certificate of limited partnership had not been filed, and the cor-
poration had not yet been incorporated.98 The account that held the 
marketable securities remained in Mrs. Church's name.99 The gov-
ernment argued that the transactions had no substance and that this 
was merely a device to remove assets from Mrs. Church's estate. lOO 
The district court found that under Texas law a valid limited part-
nership was formed notwithstanding the procedural irregularities, 
and that the limited partnership held the relevant assets. IOI 
The Church case was distinguishable from more abusive cases 
by the significant business and nontax motivations that were in-
volved. The court held that the primary purpose of the partners in 
forming the partnership was a desire to preserve the family ranch-
ing enterprise for themselves and their descendants. lo2 Bringing 
organization to the ranch would remove it from the control of one 
or more fractional, undivided-interest owners who could use the 
property at will, interfere with operations, and ultimately force a 
partition or sale of the ranch. 103 Mrs. Church and her children had 
already experienced the consequences of an undivided ownership in 
a real-estate-based business enterprise. 104 Prior to formation of the 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 84,778. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 84,777-78. 
99 See id. at 84,778. 
100 See id. at 84,779. 
101 See id. at 84,780. 
102 See id. at 84,778. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
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partnership, Mrs. Church's nephew had exercised his rights as an 
undivided owner by moving onto the ranch, interfering with opera-
tions, threatening legal action, and almost driving off the §razing 
lessee who was the major source of the ranch's income. I 5 Mrs. 
Church, her two children, and their cousin had to solve this threat 
by borrowing money to purchase the nephew's interest. 106 More-
over, they knew this nephew would likely inherit an additional in-
terest in the ranch through his father and have to be bought out 
again. 107 This did in fact occur after formation of the partnership.108 
The securities contributed to the partnership by Mrs. Church pro-
vided the $ 200,000 in capital necessary for this second buy_out. 109 
The court also noted that the partnership was formed with an eye 
toward the possibility of actively engaging in raising cattle. 110 Al-
though the ranch was in the midst of a prolonged and continuing 
drought, and the grazing lease expired in 1994 without the certainty 
that it would be renewed, the partnership was prepared, if neces-
sary, to replace this lost income through active operations. III Work-
ing capital over and above income from the ranch would have been 
necessary to engage in this activity.112 
The court also rejected the Service's arguments that section 
2703(a)(2) permitted it to ignore the partnership wrapper."3 The 
court noted that there was no legislative, regulatory, or case law 
support for this position.114 Given that the children, like Mrs. 
Church, contributed their own interests in the ranch in exchange for 
partnership interests, the court held that the transfer was not a de-
vice to transfer property to members of her family for less than full 
consideration and that the terms were comparable to those entered 
into by persons dealing at arm's length. ll5 These holdings, along 
with the court's holding that the transfers involved a bona fide 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id at 84,778-79. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. at 84,779. 
III See id. 
112 See id 
113 See id at 84,779,84,781. See also supra notes 83-88 and accompanying 
text. 
114 See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 84,781. 
115 See id at 84,779. 
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business arrangement, brought the transfers within the exception 
contained in section 2703(b).116 Thus, only the limited partnership 
interests were included in Mrs. Church's estate. Although Mrs. 
Church transferred about $1.5 million worth of assets to the limited 
partnership, the court held that after the minority-interest and lack-
of-marketability discounts, the value of the limited partnership in-
terests in her estate was about $600,000. 117 
Church is most noteworthy for being atypical of the FLLEs 
under discussion in this article. The children made substantial con-
tributions to the partnership, and there were reasons beyond estate 
planning for its formation. Mrs. Church's death was unexpected, 
and the court was clear on the bona fide business nature of the 
transaction. None of these factors will be present for a typical last-
minute FLLE. Consequently, the case provides little in the way of 
general guidance. It also does not provide much in the way of spe-
cific guidance on section 2703 for the Service or the taxpayer, since 
the court held that the transaction came within the section 2703(b) 
exception, which commonly would not be the case. 118 It does per-
haps suggest that the courts will be inclined to uphold bona fide 
transactions that follow from good planning, but that. is not exactly 
surprising. 
2. The Strange Strangi Case119 
Albert Strangi, a self-made millionaire, lived and died in 
Waco, Texas. 120 He married, divorced, and remarried, with children 
from the first marriage and stepchildren from the second. 121 Strangi 
survived his second wife. 122 A son-in-law, a lawyer, prepared many 
of the estate planning documents and held the decedent's general 
power of attomey.123 In August 1994, fresh from an estate planning 
seminar, the son-in-law formed a Texas limited partnership, SLFP, 
text. 
116 See id. at 84,779, 84,781. See also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying 
117 See Church, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 84,780. 
118 See id. at 84,779-81. 
119 Strangi, 115 T.e. 478. 
120 See id. at 478-79. 
121 See id. at 479. 
122 See id. at 480. 
123 See id. at 479. 
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and its Texas corporate general partner, Stranco, Inc. 124 At the time 
Strangi was suffering from terminal cancer. The son-in-law handled 
all of the details of the formation .and executed the documents as 
Strangi's attomey-in-fact. 125 Stranco had the sole authority to con-
duct the business affairs of SFLP without the concurrence of any 
limited partner. 126 The son-iii-law assigned to SFLP Strangi's inter-
est in certain real estate, securities, accrued interest and dividends, 
insurance policies, and annuities with a combined fair market value 
of $9,876,929. 127 Seventy-five percent of the value was attributable 
to cash and securities. 128 Strangi purchased a 47% interest in 
Stranco for $49,350, and his four children purchased the remaining 
53% for $55,650. 129 Stranco contributed $100,333 to the limited 
partnership in exchange for a 1 % partnership interest. 130 Since the 
children had control of Stranco, they technically also had control of 
the limited partnership. 131 All these transactions were completed by 
August 1994.132 In October of that year, Strangi died. 133 
In 1995, SFLP distributed several million dollars to Strangi's 
estate to pay, or otherwise address, state and federal estate and in-
heritance taxes. 134 SFLP also extended lines of credit to three of the 
children. 135 In 1995 and 1996, SFLP distributed $563;000 to each of 
the Strangi children, characterizing them as distributions from the 
estate. 136 In May 1996, SFLP divided its primary Merrill Lynch 
account into four separate accounts in each of the Strangi children's 
names, giving them control over a proportionate share of the part-
nership assets. 137 By 1998, SFLP had distributed around $2.5 mil-
lion to each of the Strangi children. 138 
124 See id. at 480-81. 
125 See id. at 480-82. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. at 481. 
128 See id. 
129 Three of the children borrowed the funds for their shares from the fourth 
child, giving unsecured promissory notes in turn. See id. 
130 See id. at 481. 
131 See id. at 481-82. 
132 See id. at 482. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. at 482-83. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. at 483. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
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When filing the estate tax return, Strangi's estate took minor-
ity-interest and lack-of-marketability discounts on the value of the 
SFLP interests it held. 139 At trial, the Service argued that the exis-
tence of SFLP should be disregarded for lack of a business purpose 
and economic substance. 140 The estate countered with two main 
arguments. First, it claimed that SFLP helped insulate Strangi from 
an anticipated tort claim by a caregiver, and the estate from a will 
contest by disinherited stepchildren, through the creation of another 
layer with which creditors would have to contend. 141 Second, the 
estate maintained that SFLP provided a joint investment vehicle for 
managing Strangi's assets. 142 The court largely rejected the estate's 
arguments, stating that there was no realistic prospect of either a 
tort claim or a will contest. 143 Since Strangi ended up with 99.47% 
of the SFLP, directly or indirectly, and three of the four Strangi 
children were not meaningfully involved in the affairs of SLFP 
prior to the fragmentation of the Merrill Lynch account, the court 
concluded that a joint-investment motive was not apparent either. l44 
Further, SFLP conducted no active business. 145 Actual control was 
exercised by the son-in-law, via the power of attorney, meaning that 
technically Strangi retained control. 146 Interestingly, the court noted 
that the Service might have had a claim that the assets of SFLP 
could have been included in Strangi's estate under section 2036. 147 
Luckily for the estate, however, the court did not address the sec-
tion 2036 issue, because the Service had failed to assert that argu-
ment in a timely manner. 148 This is an important issue, and will be 
discussed in detail below. 149 
The court concluded that despite the questionable motivations, 
SFLP was in fact a validly created entity.150 The existence of the 
partnership in fact changed the relationships between Strangi and 
139 See id. 
140 See id. at 484. 
141 See id. at 485. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. at 485-86. 
145 See id. at 486. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See infra Part IV. 
150 See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 486-87. 
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his heirs, and the court concluded that the rartnership could not be 
ignored for federal income tax purposes. 15 Although the majority 
did not state so explicitly, an inference can be drawn from the ma-
jority's rejection of any legitimate nontax motivations for the for-
mation of the limited partnership that, barring the application of 
section 2036, a legally formed state law entity cannot be ignored for 
valuation purposes. 152 As will be discussed below,153 the dissenting 
judges took issue with this perspective, which is indeed a surprising 
one. If section 2036 can be avoided, which should readily be possi-
ble,154 then a decedent can reduce the valuation of her estate by 
simply putting her assets into an FLLE before her death, notwith-
standing the fact that the FLLE was formed primarily for tax-
avoidance purposes. 155 It hardly seems sensible to allow significant 
amounts of estate taxes to be so easily avoided. The proposal set 
forth below would largely eliminate such tax avoidance. 
In Strangi, the Service argued, as it had in the TAMs,156 that 
section 2703 provided a basis for ignoring the "partnership wrap-
per.,,157 The court rejected the argument, noting that neither section 
2703's statutory nor its regulatory language supports such an inter-
pretation. 15S Chapter 14, which includes sections 2701 through 
2704, was intended to target transfer tax valuation abuses in the 
intra-family context, while relieving taxpayers of the broad sweep 
of section 2036( c) as previously enacted. 159 Congress wanted to 
value property interests more accurately when they were transferred 
instead of including previously transferred property in the trans-
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
153 See infra notes 133-53 and accompanying text. 
154 See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. 
155 See Strangi, lIS T.e. at 498 (Ruwe, J., dissenting). 
156 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
157 See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 487-88. See also supra notes 83-88 and accom-
panying text. 
158 See Strangi, lIS T.C. at 488. 
159 See id. The pre-1991 version of section 2036 provided that if a person 
held a substantial interest in an enterprise and transferred property having a dis-
proportionately large share of the potential appreciation in her interest in the 
enterprise while retaining interest in its income, she was considered to have re-
tained the enjoyment of the transferred property. See I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1990). 
That would have triggered section 2036(a), requiring inclusion of the transferred 
property in the estate at death. The court was obviously not amiss in characteriz-
ing the pre-1991 version of section 2036(c) as hav~g a broad sweep. 
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feror's gross estate. 160 The court accurately noted that treating the 
partnership assets rather than the decedent's interest in the partner-
ship as the "property" to which section 2703 applied, would raise 
anew the difficulties Congress sought to avoid by enacting Chapter 
14.161 Accordingly, the court concluded that Congress did not in-
tend through the enactment of section 2703 for the Service to be 
able to look through the partnership wrapper and treat the decedent 
as owning the assets transferred to the partnership rather than' own-
ing the partnership interest.162 Indeed, the Service's arguments un-
der section 2703 were a stretch and, as the court rightly indicated, 
clearly beyond what Congress intended when enacting section 
2703.163 Therefore, it was quite appropriate that the arguments 
failed. 
The Service also argued that Strangi made a gift when he 
transferred property to the partnership and received in return a lim-
ited partnership interest of lesser value. l64 Since Strangi gave up 
property worth $10 million and received back a limited partnership 
interest arguably worth around $6.5 million, the Service maintained 
that the difference was a gift.165 The court noted, however, that 
since Strangi's interest in SFLP exceeded 99%, and his contribution 
was allocated to his own capital account, the transfer of property 
could not be considered a gift. 166 Since essentially nothing Strangi 
put in went anywhere but to his own account, there was no one to 
whom a gift could have been made. 
While this part of the argument provides a reasonable basis 
for not finding a gift on formation, the court also stated that the de-
cedent had not given up "control over the assets," notwithstanding 
the fact that he only had a minority interest in the general partner.167 
It is not entirely clear what the court meant by this cryptic state-
ment. Perhaps the statement is no more than casual dicta, since the 
court grounded its holding on the fact that nothing of real signifi-
160 See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 488. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. at 488-89. 
163 See id. at 488. 
164 See id. at 489. 
165 See id, 
166 See id. at 489-90. The Tax Court reaffirmed this view in Jones, 116 T.C. 
at 128. 
167 Strangi, 115 T.e. at 490. 
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cance was given to others. 168 However, if the court really believed 
Strangi kept control, it is hard to understand the discount it ulti-
mately allowed. 
While the court did not accept the Service's legal arguments, it 
also did not accept the estate's valuation. 169 Rather than the 43.75% 
discount claimed by the estate, the court permitted a 31 % discount 
for the partnership interest. 170 The latter amount was based on the 
Service's experts, and the court indicated that even this discount 
could be overly generous. 171 SLFP was not in a risky business or 
one in which the continuing value of the assets depended on con-
tinuing operations, and there was no real issue as to liquidity. In 
A total of seven judges joined in the majority opinion. There 
were two concurring and four dissenting opinions.173 The number 
of dissents and concurrences indicates that the Tax Court judges are 
far from uniform in their views and that similar cases in the future 
may generate different outcomes. The appellate courts also have 
generally not yet addressed this issue. 
Judge Wells, in the only written concurrence, believed that 
the majority misapplied the "economic substance argument.,,174 
Since the majority rejected the alleged business purposes underly-
ing the formation of the partnership, a proper application of the 
economic substance doctrine would ignore the partnership, assum-
ing the doctrine's applicability.175 In Judge Wells' view, the court 
should have concluded that the economic substance doctrine did not 
operate to disregard a validly formed entity where the issue is the 
value for federal gift and estate tax purposes of the interest trans-
168 See id. 
169 See id. at 490-91. 
170 See id. at 491-92. 
171 See id. at 492-93. 
I72 See id. at 491-92. 
173 See id. at 493, 494, 496, 500. 
174 See id. at 493. The nomenclature Judge Wells used is not one that is 
commonly employed. The "substance over form" doctrine is probably the more 
common term. Judge Wells' usage is nonetheless consistent with Gregory v. 
Heivering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), cited by the majority, in which the Supreme 
Court stated that a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance 
and not shaped solely by tax avoidance features should be respected for tax pur-
poses. 293 U.S. at 469-70. Judge Foley agreed with Judge Wells' concurrence. 
See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 494. Judge Laro concurred without expressing an opin-
ion. See id. at 493. 
175 See id. at 493-94. 
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ferred in the entity. 176 This concurrence is at least slightly curious in 
that it is not at all clear that the majority in fact applied the eco-
nomic substance doctrine. Nevertheless, while not free from doubt, 
the majority did seem to reject the notion that there was any eco-
nomic substance to the formation of SLFP, and in effect appeared 
to agree with Judge Wells that the doctrine did not apply in this 
context. 177 Perhaps what troubled Judge Wells and triggered his 
concurrence was the ambiguity of the majority's discussion. Cer-
tainly, Judge Wells' opinion is far crisper in rejecting the economic 
substance doctrine than is the majority'S opinion. Indeed, the courts 
have often been more reluctant to apply the economic substance 
doctrine to federal transfer tax cases than to income tax cases, 178 
even though that reluctance has hardly been absolute.179 It is never 
been apparent why this is so. The policies underlying the doctrine 
- that structures and transactions should have an economic reality, 
rather than just being tax gambits - would seem as applicable to 
the federal transfer tax regime as to the income tax regime. The 
dissents seemed to share this view. 180 
Judge Parr wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Beghe 
and Marvel joined. 181 In the opinion, she complained that the facts 
clearly demonstrated that the written partnership agreement had no 
relationship to the reality of Strangi's ownership and control of the 
assets contributed to the partnership.182 Judge Parr disagreed with 
the majority's valuation, which assumed that the restrictions written 
in the partnership agreement were actually binding on the part-
ners.183 Even assuming that the partnership must be recognized for 
federal estate tax purposes, Judge Parr would have valued the inter-
est under the agreement that actually existed, which she felt permit-
ted funds to be withdrawn at will rather than under the written part-
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 485. 
178 See, e.g., Kohlsaat v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2732 (1997); Estate of 
Cristofani v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result, 1992-1 C.B. 1 (Mar. 23, 
1992). 
179 See Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying 
the substance over form doctrine in the transfer tax context); Griffin v. United 
States, 42 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703-704 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (same). 
180 See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 495 (Parr, J.), 499-500 (Ruwe, J.), 504-505 
(Beghe, J.). 
181 See id. at 494, 496. 
182 See id. at 494. 
183 See id. at 494-95. 
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nership agreement. 184 She argued, rather persuasively, that a minor-
ity-interest discount is premised on the fact that limited partners 
cannot force the partnership to make distributions. 185 Yet Strangi 
and his estate in fact caused the partnership to do so. A lack-of-
marketability discount is allowed because the third party would pay 
less for the partnership interest than for the assets. 186 In Judge 
Parr's view, however, under the actual facts, Strangi could have 
distributed all the assets to himself and sold them directly to the 
buyer, making the lack-of-marketability discount inappropriate. 187 
Because the actual partnership arrangement provided for distribu-
tions at will, Judge Parr would have valued the partnership interest 
at the value of the partnership assets without any discount. 188 
In his dissent, Judge Ruwe accepted the Service's gift argu-
ment.189 If the partnership interest Strangi received is worth, as the 
majority held, 31 % less than the value of the property that the dece-
dent transferred, and was not transferred for a bona fide business 
reason, then the difference should be a gift. 190 A literal reading of 
the Code and regulations might support this view. 19l A stumbling 
block for this position, however, is that, as the majority suggested, 
nothing was really given away: Strangi retained almost all of the 
partnership interests. 192 Judge Ruwe responded that it is not neces-
sary to know who the donees are for the gift tax to apply. 193 That is 
true under the treasury regulations,194 but historically, this rule has 
been applied in cases such as Robinette v. Helvering,195 where a 
remainder interest was given and the putative remaindermen, un-
born children of the grantor, did not yet exist. 196 The difficulty with 
184 See id. 
185 See id. at 496. 
186 See id. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at 497. 
190 See id. at 497 n.1. 
191 See 1.R.e. §§ 2501, 2512(b). Section 2512 states, "[W]here property is 
transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's 
worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of 
the consideration shall be deemed a gift." I.R.C. § 2512(b). 
192 See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 490,497 n.1. 
193 See id. at 499. 
194 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2. 
195 318 U.S. 184 (1943). 
196 See id. at 185-86. 
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applying that principle to the facts of Strangi is that in Strangi the 
donees were known. 197 Further, on formation of the partnership, the 
children received virtually nothing, since Strangi retained almost all 
of the interests. 198 To say there is a gift where the donor retains vir-
tually all of the beneficial interests in the underlying property defies 
common sense. Nevertheless, Judges Parr, Beghe, Gale and Marvel 
joined this dissenting opinion in Strangi and would have recognized 
a gift in such a situation. 199 , 
, Judge Beghe, in addition to joining the dissents of others, wrote 
a separate dissent. 200 He noted, no doubt correctly, that the only 
reason for the formation of SFLP was to reduce the federal transfer 
taxes by depressing the value of Strangi's assets.201 The transac-
tions did nothing to affect Strangi's or his children's interests in the 
underlying assets; the control exercised by Strangi and his children 
over the assets did not change. 202 For example, shortly after 
Strangi's death, SFLP made substantial distributions to the children, 
and the Merrill Lynch account was divided into four separate ac-
counts to allow each child to control his or her proportionate share 
of the SFLP assets.203 Since the apparent intent was to transfer as-
sets to the children, with SFLP only hopefully proving itself a fed-
eral transfer-tax-reducing way-station, Judge Beghe would have 
applied the step transaction doctrine to collapse the steps and treat 
the transfer as going from Strangi directly to his children, eliminat-
ing any SFLP-related valuation discounts.204 Judge Beghe's reason-
ing seems cogent. However, it would be fairly easy to plan around 
this simply by leaving assets in FLLE solution for longer periods of 
time and limiting the control exercised by the transferor. The pro-
posal discussed below would apply more widely and uniformly, 
while avoiding the abuse Judge Beghe correctly identified.2os 
197 See Strangi, 115 T.e. at 482-83. 
198 See id. at 481,490. 
199 See id. at 500. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. at 502. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See id. at 503, 505-506. 
205 See infra Part V. 
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IV. THE POSSmLE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2036 
Section 2036 provides that the estate of a decedent includes 
transferred property if the decedent retained possession or enjoy-
ment of the property or the right to the income from the property, 
excluding transfers for adequate consideration.206 Further, section 
2036 provides that the estate includes all assets that the decedent 
has trimsferred while retaining the right to designate who shall pos-
sess or enjoy the associated property or income.207 Given the con-
trol Strangi effectively retained, both of these provisions of section 
2036 could have applied in the case, had the Service asserted them 
in a timely manner. 208 Both Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commis-
sioner09 and Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner21O shed light on 
this issue.211 
Schauerhamer involved a widow who took control of a family 
building-material business after her husband's death.212 In Novem-
ber 1990 she was diagnosed with colon cancer. She then retained an 
attorney to assist with her estate planning.213 Three limited partner-
ships were formed, one for each of her three children.214 She and an 
alternate child were the general partners of each limited partner-
ship.215 Mrs. Schauerhamer was also the sole initial limited partner 
of each partnership as well as the managing partner of each partner-
ship with full power to manage and conduct the respective partner-
ship's affairs, and she did in fact manage each partnership. 216 In 
1990 and 1991, Mrs. Schauerhamer transferred her business assets 
in undivided one-third shares to the partnerships.217 In 1990, and 
again in 1991, she assigned 33 limited partnership interests, each 
206 See LR.C. § 2036(a)(I). The classic example: a decedent, while alive, 
transfers her home to her children, but retains the right to live in it. 
207 See LR.C. § 2036(a)(2). 
208 See Strangi, 115 T.C. at 486-87. 
209 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997). 
210 114 T.e. 144. 
211 See generally Howard M. Zaritsky, Back to Basics/or the Family Limited 
Partnership, 27 EST. PLAN. 240 (2000). 
212 See Schauerhamer, 73 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2856. 
213 See id. at 2855-56. 
214 See id. at 2856. 
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
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purportedly worth $10,000, to family me~bers.218 Mrs. Schauer-
hamer deposited all partnership income into an account that she 
held with a daughter-in-law and that she used as her personal 
checking account.219 She did not maintain any records to account 
separately for partnership and nonpartnership funds. 22o 
The court noted that the term "enjoyment" in section 2036221 is 
not a term of art but is synonymous with substantial present eco-
nomic benefit.222 Retained enjoyment may exist where there is an 
express or implied understanding at the time of the transfer that the 
transferor will retain the economic benefits of the property.223 The 
court concluded that there was such an implied agreement among 
the partners.224 Notwithstanding that each partnership agreement 
required each partnership to maintain a separate bank account and 
that partnership income be deposited in it, the partnership income 
was deposited in an account Mrs. Schauer hamer used as a personal 
checking account, where it was commingled with funds from other 
sources?25 Further, her relationship to the assets did not change 
before or after the transfer. 226 As a consequence, the court held that 
section 2036( a)( 1) required inclusion of the partnership assets in her 
estate.227 
Reichardt'involved the estate of Charles Reichardt, who had 
inherited from his wife a life interest in her separate property along 
with the power, on terms he deemed advisable, to sell, lease, or oth-
erwise dispose of any of that froperty without requiring him to ac-
count for or replace any of it. 28 In 1993, Reichardt was diagnosed 
218 See id. at 2856-57. These transfers, if correctly valued, would be exempt 
from gift tax under the $10,000 annual exclusion contained in section 2503. See 
I.R.C. § 2503(b). 
219 See Schauerhamer, 73 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2857. 
220 See id. 
221 See 1.R.e. § 2036(a)(1). 
222 See Schauerhamer, 73 T.e.M. (CCH) at 2857. 
~23 See id. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. at 2857-58. 
226 See id. at 2858. 
227 See id. at 2857-58. 
228 See 114 T.C. at 145-47. He would lose the life estate ifhe remarried. His 
wife was apparently upset about an extramarital affair that he had been having, 
and this provision was apparently an effort from the grave to control his behav-
ior, or failing that, his marital status. See id. at 146. 
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with terminal cancer.229 In June of that year, on the advice of his 
son and a CPA, Reichardt signed a will and durable power of attor-
ney, and formed a revocable living trust and a family limited part-
nership.230 The trust was the general partner of the limited partner-
ship, Reichardt and his children were trustees of the trust, and each 
was authorized to act on behalf of the truSt.231 Reichardt was enti-
tled to the net income of the trust and could use the corpus of the 
trust for his support, maintenance, health, and general welfare.232 
Reichardt placed almost all of his property in the partnership, in-
cluding his home.233 He transferred a 30.4% interest in the partner-
ship to each of his two children, claiming a gift tax value of 
$310,000.234 The court noted that Reichardt controlled and man-
aged, or allowed the co-owners to control and manage, the partner-
ship assets in the same manner both before and after his transfer of 
them to the partnership. 235 
The court stated that for purposes of section 2036, a trans-
feror retains the enjoyment of property if there is an express or im-
plied agreement at the time of the transfer that the transferor will 
retain present economic benefits of the property, even if the re-
tained right is not legally enforceable.236 The court held that Reich-
ardt did not curtail his enjoyment of the transferred property after 
he formed the partnership.237 Nothing changed except legal title: he 
managed the trust, which managed the partnership; he commingled 
partnership and personal funds. 238 The court also concluded that 
there was an implied agreement between Reichardt and his children 
that he could retain the right to make income from the transferred 
property.239 The court held that since Reichardt's relationship to the 
assets remained the same before and after the transfer, section 
229 See ill. at 147. 
230 See ill. at 147-48. 
231 See ill. at 147. 
232 See ill. at 147-48. 
233 See ill. at 148. 
234 See ill. at 148-50. 
235 See ill. at 149. 
236 See ill. at 151. 
237 See ill. at 152. 
238 See id. 
239 See id. at 153, 155, 158-59. Reichardt did not retain the right to earn in-
come from the home, but since he continued to live in it, he retained possession 
and enjoyment of it, which is one of the standards for triggering section 
2036(a)(1). See ill. at 152. 
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2036(a)(1) required the assets to be included in his estate?40 The 
estate claimed that Reichardt formed the partnership to prevent him 
from treating the transferred property imprudently. 241 The court 
rejected this argument since he stayed in effective control.242 The 
estate also contended that Reichardt's fiduciary duties as a general 
partner and trustee precluded him from retaining enjoyment of the 
assets.243 The court also rejected this argument given the effective 
control Reichardt in fact maintained and the implied agreement that 
the court found to exist between him and his children. 244 
What the Reichardt and Schauerhamer cases demonstrate, 
and the Strangi case might have demonstrated but for the Service's 
failure to raise the section 2036 issue in a timely manner, is that 
sloppy procedures invite trouble. Donors cannot commingle funds 
and maintain precontribution use of the property and then expect 
supposed transfers to keep the property out of their estates. This 
makes it obviously unwise to put purely personal-use assets such as 
the family home into an FLLE. The decedent's use of FLLE assets 
for personal purposes might not only trigger section 2036, but also 
might raise questions as to whether there is an adequate business 
purpose for the transfer.245 
Nevertheless, avoiding section 2036 should not be difficult 
for FLLEs formed shortly before death. Personal-use assets should 
not be included, and proper procedures should be followed. Obvi-
ously, partnership and personal funds should not be commingled. In 
Schauerhamer and Reichardt, the courts stated that section 2036 
could be applied if there were an express or implied agreement that 
the decedent retain the economic benefits from the contributed 
property.246 A decedent could avoid this problem simply by giving 
up much of the benefits associated with the contributed property. 
He could contribute the property to the FLLE and give a significant 
portion of the FLLE interests to family members. To avoid a Reich-
ardt situation, the decedent should not disproportionately benefit 
from the FLLE assets. The transfers would be subject to a gift tax, 
240 See id at 152-53. 
241 See id at 153. 
242 See id 
243 See id. at 154. 
244 See id. at 153-55. 
245 See supra Part II.A. 
246 See Schauerhamer, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2857; Reichardt, 114 T.C. at 
151. 
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even though the application of the annual exclusion and the appli-
cable exclusion amounts could limit the amount of taxes that actu-
ally has to be paid. 247 Further, since gift taxes paid within three 
years of death are brought back to the estate, these near-death trans-
fers would not be "gift-tax exclusive.,,248 These results will often be 
small prices to pay, however, for significant valuation discounts on 
the property contributed to the FLLE, should the reasoning of 
Strangi hold true. Further, with the decedent near death, paying gift 
taxes currently may not pose a large time-value-of-money concern, 
since an estate tax liability presumably would have applied regard-
less to the gifted property in the short run. 
While it would reduce the likelihood of the Service's attack 
if the decedent does not control the FLLE in her capacity as a gen-
eral partner or managing member, the decedent can retain such con-
trol as long as she also retains typical state-law fiduciary duties to 
the other owners. The application of those fiduciary duties will pre-
vent the general partner from disproportionately benefiting from the 
FLLE assets. The Service has frequently ruled that the fiduciary 
duties to which a general partner is subject will prevent section 
2036 from applying to business property contributed by the general 
partner to a limited partnership.249 Of course, the fiduciary duties 
have to be real: a private agreement obviating otherwise applicable 
state-law fiduciary duties would run afoul of Reichardt. 
Additionally, gifting away interests in the FLLE to other family 
members may pose psychological problems. Many resist yielding 
absolute control until they breathe their last breath. Many also fear 
giving up the assets they might need to endure the fmal stages of 
life. For those of moderate wealth, this latter point may be more 
than just a psychological concern and, indeed, may be a valid rea-
son to minimize transfers. Taxpayers with substantial wealth, how-
ever, can transfer substantial assets without this .concern. They will 
typically have assets for which they have no direct need and that 
247 See I.R.C. § 2503(b). See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
248 See I.R.C. § 2035(b). Gift taxes paid more than three years before death 
are "gift-tax exclusive," meaning that the gift taxes are paid from other assets of 
the donor, further reducing the size of the donor's estate. Estate taxes are never 
"exclusive," since the estate taxes are paid from the assets of the taxable estate. 
See 1.R.c. § 2001(a); 
249 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9546007 (Nov. 17, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
9546006 (Nov. 17, 1995); HENKEL, supra note 2, § 16.03[4]. Accord United 
States v. Byrumf, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1972). 
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can be contributed to the FLLE. If they are willing to put aside any 
psychological limitations and either give up control or retain rele-
vant fiduciary duties, section 2036 should not pose a problem, and 
substantial assets can be transferred close to the time of death at 
reduced gift tax cost after the application of valuation discounts as 
seemingly sanctioned by Strangi. 
While the court's interpretation of section 2036 in Reichardt is 
admittedly reasonable, the policy support is questionable. Effec-
tively, the court's holding imposes a limitation on those of moder-
ate wealth who have legitimate concerns about retaining enough 
assets to get through the fmal stages of life. Those with more sub-
stantial wealth can readily fund the partnership with appropriate 
assets and follow appropriate procedures. It is not apparent why the 
latter group should be preferred to the former. Finally, section 2036 
in this context is an invitation to litigation, since it forces one to ask 
difficult questions. Did the decedent really give up control or, as 
was likely in Strangi, did he merely give up the appearance of con-
trol while maintaining control in fact, thereby triggering section 
2036? Have state-law fiduciary duties been subverted by a private 
agreement by the parties to favor the decedent? My proposal, dis-
cussed below, would both apply more neutrally and provide an un-
ambiguous standard that would not invite undue litigation. 
v. PRoPOSAL FOR REFORM 
It is hardly good tax policy to allow taxpayers in the last 
hours of life to place their assets in an essentially artificial structure 
and thereby significantly reduce federal transfer taxes. In longer-
standing FLLEs, taxpayers typically make gifts of FLLE interests to 
the next generation and argue for minority-interest and lack-of-
marketability discounts on those gifts. Here the Service has also 
resisted taxpayers' arguments.250 While a full discussion of whether 
taxpayers should ever be allowed to use FLLEs to reduce federal 
transfer taxes is beyond the scope of this article, I would note that 
the argument for discounts for such longer-standing FLLEs is at 
least stronger. One cannot always assume, for example, that donee-
siblings will have amicable relations and act jointly. As a result of 
the gifts to the next generation, the interests in the FLLE may be 
250 See, e.g., Jones, 116 T.e. 121; Knight, 115 T.e. 506; Harper, 79 T.e.M. 
(CCH) 2232; Kerr, 113 T.C. 449. 
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spread out among a number of members of the family. After the 
gifts are made, someone who wants to buy all the FLLE assets may 
have to negotiate with a number of underlying owners.251 One fam-
ily member's FLLE interest may indeed be worth far less than the 
proportional share of the fair market value of the underlying assets. 
But in an FLLE formed shortly before death, the situation is very 
different. 
In these near-death transactions, beneficial ownership typi-
cally stays primarily with the decedent, so the diversity of interests 
that can justify discounts usually is lacking. Of course, significant 
beneficial ownership in the FLLE could be transferred to others. 
Given the proximity of death, there would likely be no federal 
transfer tax benefit beyond the discounts. Gift taxes paid within 
three years of death are included in the estate?52 Values of the 
property are unlikely to change between the time of the contribution 
and the time of death, and the unified gift and estate tax system 
adds gifts made during life and after death together to compute the 
transfer tax?53 Transferring interests to others proved effective in 
Frank. 254 Such transfers of FLLE interes!s to others, however, 
would not seem to provide an intelligent basis for differing tax 
treatment. All that is likely involved is a last-minute artifice without 
any genuine economic substance. Even estranged family members 
probably will fmd a way to get along, considering the desire to ob-
tain the discounts and the short period of time until the decedent 
dies upon which the FLLE is possibly dissolved and its assets dis-
tributed. 
One avenue of attack is section 2036, but, as noted above,255 its 
application would not be difficult to avoid for wealthier decedents 
who have assets for which they have no fmancial need. To avoid 
section 2036, they simply need to avoid transferring personal-use 
assets to the FLLE, gift away meaningful amounts of the FLLE in-
terests, and exercise whatever control they retain through the FLLE 
in a fiduciary capacity. Section 2036 does not always provide a re-
liable bright line test, and accordingly, faGtual disputes could arise 
251 The Uniform LLC Act requires the consent of all members to a sale of all 
or substantially all of the assets of an LLC. See UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY COMPANY 
ACT § 404(c)(l2), 6A U.L.A. 458 (1995). 
252 See 1.R.c. § 2035(b). 
253 See 1.R.c. § 2001(b). 
254 See 69 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2256-57,2259,2263. 
255 S V ee supra Part I . 
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as to whether the decedent is adhering to his fiduciary duties and/or 
receiving a disproportionate benefit. 
Another option would be to apply some form of family-
attribution rules and ignore the FLLE wrapper when the FLLE is 
controlled by family members. While this approach would be effec-
tive in stopping many abuses, it would be much broader than 
needed to address the abuse of last-minute FLLEs. For longer-
standing FLLEs, one cannot assume family members will have 
amicable relations or readily come to agreement on when and 
whether to sell the underlying assets. Thus, in this context minority-
interest and lack-of-marketability discounts for the diversely held 
interests of family members often are justifiable and represent eco-
nomic reality. That fact would make it politically difficult to craft a 
rule that always ignores the FLLE wrapper for family-controlled 
FLLEs. The Clinton Administration's unsuccessful efforts to make 
a frontal assault on FLLEs are instructive in this regard.256 
A more focused approach, and one that would be easy to 
administer, would be to bring transfers of property to FLLEs within 
the scope of section 203~. 257 Under this approach, any contributions 
made to a farriily-controlled FLLE by a decedent within three years 
of death would be a nonevent for Federal estate tax purposes?58 
The property transferred, and not the associated FLLE interests, 
would be included in the decedent's estate. Another concern is that 
a decedent could operate an FLLE as the primary owner for a pro-
longed period. Then, in an attempt to obtain increased valuation 
discounts, the decedent could transfer control of the FLLE at the 
256 The Clinton administration had on several occasions proposed that trans-
fers of interests in FILEs be subject to a valuation discount only if the entity is 
engaged in an active trade or business. The Clinton Administration had no suc-
cess with its proposals. See, e.g., Congo Budget Office, 106th Cong., Analysis of 
the President's Budgetary Proposals for FY2001, 93218 (Comm. Print 2000); 
H.R. Rep. No. 106-658, Providing for the Consideration of H.R. 8, The Death 
Tax Elimination Act of 2000, at 8-10 (Comm. Print 1998); Congo Budget Office, 
105th Cong., Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for FY99, 93212 
(Comm. Print 1998). 
257 Currently, section 2035 requires inclusion in the decedent's estate gift 
taxes paid within three years of death and transfers made within three years of 
death which, if they had not been made, would have resulted in the transferred 
property being included in the estate under sections 2036 through 2038, or 2042. 
See 1.R.c. § 2035. 
258 This rule, of course, would not apply to the extent the decedent is paid 
fair value (in other than FILE interests) for the property transferred. 
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end of her life. To counter this strategy, under this proposal any 
transfers of FLLE interests in a family-controlled FLLE made 
within three years of death would also be ignored, and the trans-
ferred interests would be included in the decedent's estate. This 
latter part of the rule would effectively codify Murphl59 and over-
rule Frank.260 As section 2001 already provides, credit will be 
given against the estate tax for any gift tax paid on the lifetime 
transfers. 261 Under these rules, if a decedent contributes property to 
a family-controlled FLLE within three years of death, and also 
transfers FLLE interests within that time period, the following 
would occur: the property transfers would be ignored, and the prop-
erty would be included in the decedent's estate; the FLLE interests 
would also be included in the decedent's estate, but they would be 
valued as if the ·FLLE did not hold the property that was pulled 
back into the decedent's estate. 
An FLLE for these purposes would include a limited part-
nership, LLC, or S-corporation. An S-corporation is an unlikely 
vehicle for this type of planning, because the gain is recognized 
when an S-corporation distributes appreciated property to a share-
holder.262 Nevertheless, like limited partnerships and LLCs, S-
corporations typically impose a single level of taxation on income 
at the owner level and could conceivably be used in a manner com-
parable to limited partnerships and LLCs. S-corporations are in-
cluded in the proposal to make sure the door to this type of abuse is 
fully shut. The double-tax burden of C-corporations would make 
them an inappropriate vehicle for such last-minute planning,263and 
thus they would not be included in the defmition of an FLLE. 
For section 2035 to apply under this proposal, the beneficial 
ownership of the transferred assets or FLLE interests must stay with 
text. 
259 Murphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645. 
260 Frank, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2255. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying 
261 See I.R.C. § 2001(b). 
262 See I.R.C. § 311(b). 
263 C-corporations are subject to two levels of taxation, one at the corporate 
level and another at the shareholder level, when corporate income is distributed 
to shareholders as dividends. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301, 316. Further, distributions of 
appreciated property by a C-corporation cause gain to be recognized by the cor-
poration, and the shareholder receiving the property as a dividend has ordinary 
income to the extent of the fair market value of the property. See 1.R.c. §§ 301, 
311(b). 
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the decedent or within the decedent's family and the decedent's 
family needs to control the FLLE. Since section 2701 provides rules 
often relevant for valuing FLLEs, it would seem an appropriate 
place to look for a definition of "family" for these purposes. Section 
2701 defines "family" to include the transferor; the. transferor's 
spouse; a lineal descendant of the transferor or the transferor's 
spouse, and the spouse of any such descendant; the definition also 
includes an ancestor of the transferor or the transferor's spouse, and 
the spouse of any such ancestor.264 This excludes collaterals such as 
uncles and nephews; but such persons are less likely to be involved, 
and a defmition of family already in use in a related area is more 
likely to fmd acceptance than would a more expanded definition. 
Similarly, for purposes of determining whether the family controls 
the FLLE, the definition of control contained in section 2701 could 
be used.265 That section defmes control for partnerships (including 
LLCs taxed as partnerships) as the holding of at least 50% of the 
capital or profit interests in the partnership.266 In the case of a lim-
ited partnership, control is defined as the holding of any general 
partnership interest by a family member. 267 For corporations, con-
trol means the holding of at least 50% by vote or value of the stock 
of the corporation. 268 
While even those transfers made more than three years before 
death may involve the hopes of eventual estate tax savings, the 
structure is far more likely to bear the markings of legitimacy. 
Typically, the transferor after the formation of the FLLE will trans-
fer interests to others, providing legitimate dispersion of interests. 
Section 2036 would still be available to attack transactions where 
the transferor keeps undue control and benefit. Further, the passage 
of three years at least suggests that the structure has some signifi-
cant economic reality. 
One potential, although inferior, option would be to apply, in 
addition to the three-year provision, a rule actually requiring a de-
cedent to transfer to others some minimum amount of interest in the 
FLLE for the FLLE wrapper to be respected. For example, perhaps 
a minimum of 20% of the interests would need to be transferred to 
264 See I.R.C. § 2701(e)(1), (2). 
265 See 1.R.c. § 2701(b)(2). 
266 See id. 
267 See I.R.C. § 2701(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
268 1.R.c. § 2701 (b)(2)(A). 
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others more than three years before death, or all of the interests held 
by the decedent would be valued without the FLLE wrapper. This 
approach would not be indefensible, and would help insure that 
there is substance to the FILE, rather than simply approximating an 
alter ego of the decedent. Such a rule, however, would break a fun-
damental, and too often violated, principle of tax legislation: the tax 
system should only address problems that are, or are likely to be, 
reasonably widespread. Given the need to transfer assets to the 
FLLE three years before death and the risk of the applications of 
section 2036 in any event, the vast majority of taxpayers will in fact 
make appropriate transfers of FLLE interests to others. Therefore, 
there is little need to craft a rule for situations in which this does not 
occur, and our already Byzantine tax code does not need more pro-
visions of only limited application. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is not difficult to understand the frustration of the Service 
and most of the judges in the Strangi case.269 The creation of 
FLLEs near the time of the death of the decedent usually involves 
no more than a naked artifice designed to reduce transfer taxes. 
Normally, these FLLEs have little economic substance or nontax 
business ptirpose. Yet the current tax code does not provide a ready 
touchstone from which to address the problem. Amending section 
2035 to apply a three-year rule to FLLEs formed near the time of 
death would provide a straightforward solution to the problem, and 
would also make the rule easier to administer without unduly in-
fringing upon the legitimate use of FLLEs. 
269 See supra notes 102-151 and accompanying text. 
